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[L. A. No. 22110. In Bank. Apr. 28, 1953.] 
RALPH H. GROVES, Hespondent, v. CITY OF l.JOS 
ANGELES et al., Appellants. 
[1] Licenses- Exemptions- Insurance Companies and Agents.-
A city ordinance imposing a license tax on a person engaged in 
the business of soliciting, effecting and negotiating under-
takings of bail as agent of an insurance company violates 
Const., art. XIII, § 14 4/5, declaring that state tax on insurance 
companies based on income from business done within state 
is in lieu of all other taxes and licenses on such insurers and 
their property. 
[2a, 2b] Brokers-Bail Bond Brokers-Licensed Agents.--In view 
of the statutory provision that an insurer cannot conduct a 
bail bond business except by and through a licensed bail agent 
(Ins. Code, § 1800), it will be presumed that the insurer obeyed 
the law (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 33), and therefore 
is doing its business through a licensed agent. 
[3) Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Licensed Agents.-The holding of a 
bail agent's license, which must have the approval of the in-
surer, is evidence of agency. 
[ 4] Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Licensed Agents.-Requirements of 
Insurance Code that bail bond agents must meet special qualifi-
cations and obtain a license, and contracts between an in-
surance company and its general agent which refer to "sale" 
of bonds by former to latter for "resale" to bail agents, and 
similarly those between general agent and a bail agent which 
refer to "sale" by former to latter for "resale" by him to the 
public, as well as requirement that bail agent must indemnify 
general agent rather than insurer for losses, while factors to be 
considered are not so compelling as to refute wholly the basic 
circumstances that insurer may only conduct a bail bond busi-
ness through agents, and does not support claim that bail agent 
is conducting an independent business. 
[5] Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Agency for Insurer.-A bail agent is 
not an independent contractor merely because, pursuant to 
agreement with the insurer or its general agent, rebates on 
premiums are given or commissions split by them, since it is 
plain from Ins. Code, § 1809, that in all matters in respect 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Licenses, § 38. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Bail and Recognizance, § 47 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Bail and Recognizance (Rev. ed.), § 10. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Licenses, § 38; [2-9] Brokers, § 187; 
[10] Statutes,§ 180(2). 
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thereto the surety on the bail bond is the principal and all 
licensees connected with the transaction are the surety's agents. 
[6] Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Agency for Insurer.-The fact that 
bail agents are subject to regulation and must meet certain 
qualifications does not deprive them of the character of agents 
for the insurer. 
[7] Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Agency for Insurer.--1\IIere fact that 
bail agent, having agreed to pay insurer specified percentage 
of face amount of each bond sold, may charge for the bond 
such percentage as he desires not exceeding 10 per cent, does 
not necessarily establish him as an independent contractor 
rather than as the insurer's agent. 
[8] Id.-Bail Bond Brokers-Premium for Bond.-The full sum 
received by a bail agent from one desiring a bail bond is 
the gross premium for the bond, and as he does so as agent for 
the insurer it is immaterial how the insurer, its general agent 
and the bail agent choose to allocate the allowance, or that the 
bail agent does not pay all of the 10 per cent of the face of 
the bond, which he charges his customer or client, to the in-
surer or its general agent; the insurer can only act througli 
agents, and as wliat tlie agent receives in legal effect tlie in-
surer receives, a mere bookkeeping metliod cannot thwart tlie 
law. 
[9] Id. -Bail Bond Brokers- Premium for Bond.-Wliere bail 
agent, pursuant to agreement with insurer, may cliarge for 
eacli bond sold sucli percentage as lie desires not exceeding 
10 per cent of tlie face amount tliereof, and books of tlie 
insurer show tliat it lias received 1 per cent of sucli amount, 
sucli 1 per cent may not be construed as the only premium; 
tlie 9 per cent retained by the agent would also constitute 
premium. 
[10] Statutes-Construction-Departmental Construction.-An ad-
ministrative construction wliich is erroneous is not binding on 
a court. 
APPEATJ from a judgment of the Superior Court of h1s 
Angeles County. John Gee Clark, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to enjoin a city from collecting a license tax. ,J udg-
ment for plaintiff affirmed. 
l~ay h Chesebro, City Attorney, John L. 1Nynn, Assistant 
City Attorney, and W. h "Weber, Deputy City Attorney, for 
Appellants. 
[10] See Cal.Jur., Statutes, § 152; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 319. 
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IJatham & Watkins and Keene ·watkins as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Appellants. 
0. Revelle Harrison and Thomas B. Sawyer for Respondent. 
J;Jdmuncl G. Brown, .Attorney General, and Harold B. Haas, 
Deputy Attorney General as Amici Curiae on behalf of Re-
Rpondent. 
CAR'l'ER, J .-Defendants, the City of Los Angeles, and 
its chief of police and city clerk (who is its tax collector) 
appeal from a judgment declaring invalid its Ordinance No. 
77,000 as amended by Ordinance No. 92,414, and enjoining 
the collection of the license tax thereunder. The court found 
that plaintiff is engaged in the business of soliciting, effect-
ing and negotiating undertakings of bail in and out of Los 
Angeles as agent of National Automobile and Casualty Insur-
ance Company, a corporation, (hereafter called National) 
authorized to engage and engaged in the insurance business 
(including bail bonds) in California; he holds a bail agent's 
lieense issued under the law of this state. (Ins. Code, § 1800 
et seq.) 
Ordinance No. 77,000 as amended by Ordinance No. 92,414 
provides that every person in the business of " ' ... soliciting, 
neg·otiating, effecting, issuing, delivering, or furnishing bail 
bonds or of the posting of undertakings of bail for the release 
of persons charged with public offenses shall pay for each 
calendar year, or fractional part thereof, a license tax in 
the sum of $50.00 for the first $5,000 or less of gross receipts, 
and in addition thereto, the sum of $5.00 per year for each 
additional $1,000 of gross receipts, or fractional part thereof, 
in excess of $5,000. The term "gross receipts" as used herein 
shall not include any insurance premiums received on behalf 
of any insurance company qualified to do business in the State 
of California, nor any commissions paid out of such pre-
miums.' '' Also thereunder it is unlawful for any person to 
engag·e in the specified business without a license and any 
person violating the ordinance is subject to punishment. 
'rhe license tax is, however, for purposes of revenue, not 
regulation. (See Fox Etc. Corp. v. City of Bakersfield, 36 Cal. 
2d 136 [222 P.2d 879].] 
ft was also found that plaintiff is not eng·aged in the business 
of posting bail bonds from which he receives gross receipts 
as defined in the ordinance other than in the transaction 
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of insurance business as defined by the Insurance Code. 
[1] Hence the ordinance violates the Constitution which 
provides that every insurance company (the term ''com-
pany" includes persons) doing business in the state shall 
pay to the state a tax consisting of a fixed per cent upon the 
amount of the ''gross premiums'' received upon its business 
done in this state, and "The tax imposed on insurers by this 
section is in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, State, county, 
and municipal, upon such insurers and their property" with 
exceptions not here pertinent. (Cal. Const., art. XIII, 
§ 14 4/5.) 
By its judgment the court declared the ordinance invalid 
insofar as it purports to impose a tax on plaintiff and that 
he is not liable for a tax thereunder; defendants are enjoined 
from collecting any taxes levied on plaintiff by virtue of the 
ordinance. 
According to the evidence plaintiff's business arrangement, 
generally, was as follows: Groves (not the plaintiff) and 
Rubin, a partnership doing business as Associated Bond & 
Insurance Agency (referred to as Associated) is in the surety 
bail bond business as general agent for National and the 
partners hold bail agents' licenses. Associated holds general 
power of attorney from National and power to appoint agents 
for it over whom it exercises close supervision. It appointed 
plaintiff as one of such agents for National. Upon receiving 
an application for a bail bond upon a form furnished by and 
addressed to National, plaintiff would send it to Associated. 
It is executed by Associated under its power of attorney from 
National and delivered to plaintiff-National's agent. The 
agent reported to Associated every week on business trans-
acted, and the latter reported weekly to National. Agents, 
such as plaintiff, could charge for a bail bond, any percentage 
of the face amount not exceeding 10 per cent. They paid 
2 per cent of the face amount of the bond (part of which was 
for a reserve fund to meet losses on bonds) less a certain per 
cent to Associated and the latter paid 1 per cent of the 
amount of the bond, less its commission to National. National 
is the surety or ''insurer'' on the bond and the one to whom 
the state looks in case of forfeiture. As between the agent and 
Associated the former had to make good a loss from forfeiture, 
and Associated was in the same position as National in that 
respect. 
This case has been on appeal before (Groves v. City of Los 
Angeles, 93 Cal.App.2d 17 [208 P.2d 254] ). There plaintiff 
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appealed from a judgment of dismissal after defendants' 
demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. The judg-
ment was reversed. Based upon the plaintiff's allegations that 
he vvas issuing bail bonds as agent of National and that the 
latter has paid all the in lieu taxes under section 14 4/5 of 
article XIII of the Constitution, s1tpra, the court held the 
judgment erroneous, reasoning that no insurer could execute 
a bail bond except through a person holding a bail license 
(Ins. Code, § 1800) and that plaintiff alleged he was the agent 
for National and no more. Hence there was no basis 
for any assumption that plaintiff was engaged in an inde-
pendent business or that the revenue from his business was 
derived from such independent activity within the meaning of 
the last sentence of the ordinanee, supra, which excludes from 
its provisions, insurance premiums received on behalf of an 
insnranee company qualified to do business in this state. 
Defendants eontend that plaintiff is an independent con-
tractor rather than an agent for National and that hence 
rwither he nor National through him is engaged in the insur-
ance business in the state and thus the in lieu tax provisions 
of the Constitution, supra, do not apply, that the ordinance 
does not purport to tax an insurance business (exempted 
under last section, .mpra) and that therefore the judgment 
enjoining the collection of the tax is erroneous. 
The law on the subject was settled in Hughes v. Los 
Angeles, 168 Cal. 764 [145 P. 94]. When the Hughes case 
was decided the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 14 (b) ) 
provided substantially the same as now for a state tax on the 
gross premiums of insurance companies vvhich was "in lieu of 
all other taxes or licenses, state, county and municipal upon 
the property of such companies . . . '' A Los Angeles revenue 
ordinance imposed a tax of $10 per quarter on every person 
or corporation carrying on the business of local or general 
insurance agent, solicitor or broker. The court held the ordi-
nance violated the Constitution, stating: ''Under the authority 
of Los Angeles Tntst Co. v. City of Los Angeles, (L. A. No. 
3271), ante, p. 762 [145 P. 94], this day decided, no doubt 
can be entertained but that if this privilege tax were imposed 
upon the insurance companies themselves it would be invalid. 
The distinction sought to be drawn in this case is that this 
particular license fee is not imposed upon the companies but 
upon the agents of the companies. This is true, but upon the 
other hand it is equally true that every insurance corporation 
must act through agents and can act only through agents, and 
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that, therefore, in a direet and immediate sense a tax upon 
sneh agents for the right to do business is a tax upon the 
('Orporation 's right to do business. The agents of corpora-
tiom; are the means whereby the corporations live and in op-
position to a tax upon their agents the corporations may 
well be heard to voice Shylock's expostulation: 
" 'You take my house when you do take the prop 
'rhat doth sustain my house; you take my life 
~When you do take the means whereby I live.' " 
(HtLghes v. Los Angeles, supra, 168 Cal. 764.) 
In 1937, the Legislature adopted a statute providing that 
''An insurer shall not execute an undertaking of bail except 
by and through a person holding a bail license issued as pro-
vided in this chapter." (Ins. Code, § 1800.) 
It was held in Edu;ard Brown &: Sons v. McColgan, 53 
Cal.App.2d 504 [128 P.2d 186], that the in lieu tax pro-
vision of the Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 14 4/5, 
supra) for insurance eompanies did not exempt a corporation, 
which was an agent representing and selling policies for some 
18 insurance companies, from the state corporation franchise 
tax applicable generally to corporations. In view of the 
holding of this eourt in the Hughes case, supra, 168 Cal. 
764, the soundness of the last eited case may be questionable. 
However, it may be distinguished on the ground that, although 
the franchise tax is computed on the net income of the cor-
poration, it is on the privilege of using the corporate mechan-
ism to do business and hence has no relation to the nature of 
the business conducted. Thus the tax is not on the insurance 
business within the meaning of the Constitution. 
Defendants argue, however, that here the plaintiff was an 
independent contractor rather than an agent of National and 
he was engaged in an independent business which was not 
the insurance business or National's business. Hence his 
business is taxable by the city, and by reason of the last sen-
tence of the ordinance it does not purport to tax other than 
that business, and the Hughes case is distinguishable. In 
effect, they are asserting that the evidence does not support 
the trial court's findings that plaintiff was engaged in no 
business other than that of insurance and that he was Na-
tional's agent. 
[2a] At the outset, we have the statutory provision that an 
insurer cannot conduct a bail bond business except by and 
through a licensed bail agent (Ins. Code, § 1800, supra). 
[3] Even the holding of an agent's license, which must have 
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the approval of the insurer, is evidence of agency (Thompson-
Cadillac Co. v. United States Casualty Go., 180 Wash. 481 
[40 P.2d 170]; Stoner v. First American Fire Ins. Go., 218 
Iowa 720 [2:53 N.W. 821] ; 111acDonald v. JJJ.ilwa1.tkee Mechanics' 
Ins. Go., 167 F.2d 276). [2b] It will not be assumed that 
National is violating § 1800 of the Insurance Code, supra. 
On the contrary, the presumption is that it obeyed the law 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1963 ( 1), ( 33) ) , and therefore is doing its 
hail bond business through plaintiff as its agent. In 
addition it appears that National gave broad powers to Asso-
eiated as its agent, expressly authorizing Associated to 
appoint bail agents for National and to execute bail bonds. 
Associated was, in effect, substantially the same as an officer 
of National. Associated exercised close and direct supervision 
over the agents appointed by it including plaintiff and limited 
the maximum per cent the agents could charge for the bonds. 
The agents filed weekly complete reports of business trans-
acted with Associated and the latter in turn with National. 
[4] In support of their claim of independent business, and 
that plaintiff is not an agent, defendants point to the re-
quirement of the Insurance Code that bail bond agents must 
meet special qualifications and obtain a license to act as 
such; that the contracts between National and Associated 
refer to the "sale" of the bonds by the former to the latter 
for "resale" to bail agents and similarly those between Asso-
ciated and the agents refer to ''sale'' by Associated to the 
agent for "resale" by him to the public; that plaintiff-agent 
must indemnify Associated rather than National for losses 
on bonds, and Associated indemnifies National; and that plain-
tiff maintains his own offices, pays his expenses, controls his 
affairs and fixes the amount he charges as fees for arranging 
for bonds. While those things may be factors to consider 
Garrison v. State of California, 64 Cal.App.2d 820 [149 
P.2d 711]), they are not so compelling as to refute wholly 
the basic circumstances that National may only conduct a 
hail bond business throug·h agents and hence it must be doing 
so here; Associated is empowered by National to appoint 
and does appoint agents such as plaintiff through vvhom Na-
tional conducts its bail bond bnsine;;s; ~".ssociated is National's 
instrumrntality or agent to appoint agents, and, as such, 
t•xervis(eS dose supervision over- them: the amount r~harged for 
a bond is limited by Assoeiated to a maximum of 10 per eent. 
'l'he use of the terminolo~;y of "sale" with reference to 
tho bonds as between National, Associated, and the agents, 
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is of little assistance to defendants, because calling it a "sale" 
by the agent of something (a bond) purchased by him, is not 
realistic in view of the other circumstances. There is really 
no sale as there is no pretense that the title to a bond passes 
to Associated, then to the agent and finally to a member of 
the public. Indeed the testimony shows that a mere record-
keeping device was in the minds of the parties. One of the 
partners of Associated testified : 
'' Q. BY MR. FLYNN: Now, am I correct in understanding 
your statement, Mr. Groves, that the premium, so far as the 
copy is concerned, is one per cent~ A. That is the amount 
that is put in here, and the amount that is--
'' THE CoURT : That is paid to the company¥ 
''THE WITNESS: No. It is quite something to explain. That 
is the way it was devised at the time these forms were pre-
pared. There was a question, so your Honor will really get 
what the full picture is-there was a question as to whether 
or not if the company would have to pay on the gross amount 
that the agent received as a tax, which necessitated then each 
agent filing a complete list of each and every bond written, 
the total amount he received. If they were outside of the 
State of California, he had to deduct them, and so forth. It 
made quite a thing, and so then it was devised that this re-
ceipt which would show one per cent here is the amount the 
insurance company or surety company would presumably pay 
the state tax on, and the balance was to presumably go to 
the agent and to us, and then we pay the company.'' (Rep. 
Tr., p. 106.) 
[5] Defendants rely upon various provisions of the In-
surance Code, asserting that a broker dealing in ordinary 
insurance is an agent of the insured and not the insurer, and 
rebates on premiums may not be given or commissions split by 
them except where he is placing the insurance with sureties 
which have not appointed them as agents, citing Ins. Code, 
§§ 750. 755, 755.5, which are not applicable to bail insurance 
'' ... except that in such case the licensee who executes the 
nndertaking or executes or delivers the bail bond shall, in 
all matter-s in r-espect thereto, be deemed the principal and 
all licensees otherwise connected with the transaction shall 
be deemed his agents in respect thereto." (Ins. Code, § 1809.) 
(Emphasis added.) They reason that therefore the bail agent 
is an independent contractor like an insurance broker. Ac-
cepting their premise it is plain from§ 1809, supra, like § 1800, 
supr-a, that in all matters in respect thereto (even if commis-
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siom; are split or rebates given) the snrety on the bail bond is 
the principal and all licrnsees connected ·with the transaction 
are the ~mrety 's agent. [6] 'l'he fact that bail ag·ents are 
subject to regulation and mm;t meet certain qualifications does 
not deprive them of the character of agents for the insurer. 
'rrue, the insurer may not deprive an agent of his state license, 
but it can discharge him as its agent, and before he can cmJ-
timw to do bm;iness as a bail agent, he must find another 
insurer for 1vhom br may aet a::; an agent and the insuranel' 
commissioner must be notified thereof. 
One of the main contentions of defendants is that the 
money reeeived by plaintiff-agent other than the 1 per eent 
paid to National is not premium for the bond; that the ordi-
nance purports to reach only such receipts of the agent be-
cause it excludes from the tax on his gross receipts any in-
surance premiums received by him on behalf of an insurance 
company, and, therefore, it does not violate the constitutional 
provision as the latter reserves to the state the right to tax 
gross premiums of insurance companies; that lacking the 
eharacteristies of premiums, plaintiff's business in receiving 
them is independent and not as agent of National. 
It is urged that the foregoing question is not involved 
in this ease because it does not eoncern whether the state may 
tax those receipts, and that the sole issue is whether plaintiff 
was National's agent and within the holding of H1tghes v. 
City of Los Angeles, supra, 168 Cal. 764, and thus subject to 
the ordinance. \Ve believe, however, that the question is so 
intimately eonnected with the problem presented that it must 
be determined. While it is true that no insurance company 
is a party to this proceeding and there are actions pending in 
the superior court for Los Angeles County by the state against 
insuranee companies to recover gross premium taxes which 
involve sueh reeeipts, the state Insuranee Commissioner and 
several insurance companies, including National, have filed 
briefs in this case and diseuss the q nestion. The judgment 
rendered by thr trial eourt in this case is broad. It deelares 
that plaintiff is not subject to the tax provided for under the 
ordinance and enjoins defendants from eollecting any such 
tax from plaintiff. Moreover, it is clear that the nature of 
plaintiff's receipts has some bearing upon whether, in con-
dueting the business by which he receives them, he is doing 
an insurance business for National. 
[7] Defendants point out (heretofore mentioned) that 
the receipt given by the plaintiff-agent to the one obtaining the 
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bail bond, mentions only the 1 per cent received by National as 
the premium, and the rest is for services in arranging for the 
bond. Also he bears the burden of his expenses in conducting 
the business and may charge for the bond such percentage as 
he desires not exceeding 10 per cent. We hold, however, that 
that does not necessarily establish him as an independent con-
tractor rather than National's agent. [8] We believe also 
that there is no escape from the conclusion that the full sum 
received by him from the one desiring the bail bond is the 
gross premium for the bond. National may act only through 
agents and plaintiff is its agent. All the business transacted 
by plaintiff is agency business, the end objective and result of 
which is to find takers of bail bonds and to furnish bail bonds 
to applicants therefor, and the amount charged the applicant 
for a bond is the premium on that bond. It is not significant 
how National, Associated and plaintiff choose to allocate that 
amount, such as for various services, premiums, etc. That is 
nothing more than an intramural arrangement for their con-
venience. The fact remains that whatever plaintiff receives 
from the customer or client for a bond, he is authorized to 
obtain it, and does so as agent of National. The question 
should not turn on whether the amount charged for the bond is 
broken down to specific items for their convenience. The 
situation should be the same as where National paid plaintiff's 
expenses incurred in writing bonds, because those expenses 
would be reflected in the gross premium paid-the amount 
charged the applicant for a bond. Nor is it persuasive 
that plaintiff-agent does not pay all of the 10 per cent he 
receives to Associated or National. There is little difference 
whether he uses it to defray the expenses of conducting the 
bail bond business and pay himself a commission or whether 
all of it is paid to National which in turn pays him a com-
mission and meets the expenses. The essence of the 
matter is that the amount paid by the insured for the bond 
is the premium and it has been so recognized by the courts. 
(See Bankers Life Co. v. Richardson, 192 Cal. 113 [218 P. 
586]; Western T. Ace. Assn. v. Johnson, 14 Cal.App.2d 306 
[58 P.2d 206]; Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 
192 Cal. 369 [219 P. 1003] ; Industrial Indem. Exch. v. State 
Board of Equalization, 26 Cal.2d 772 [161 P.2d 222] ; State 
Farm etc. Ins. Co. v. Carpente1·, 31 Cal.App.2d 178 [87 P.2d 
867] . ) And a mere bookkeeping method cannot thwart the 
law. (Industrial Indem. Exch. v. State Board of Equalization, 
supra, 26 Cal.2d 772.) Defendants seem to think that State 
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Ji1a,rm Etc. Ins. Go: v. Gar·penter, supra, 31 Cal..App.2d 178, 
holding that a membership fee to become a member of an 
insurance organization is not a part of the premium, and 
Mntual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Richarclson., supra, 192 Cal. 
369. holding· that the amount of the premium stated in the 
poliey above the cost thereof and declared as a dividend to 
the insured, was not premium, are opposed to the views here 
expressed, bnt those holdings on the facts are not contrary to 
the prineiple here stated, because the snms paid were not 
what was actually g'iven by the insured for his insurance. 
ln the first case above cited the membership fee did not entitle 
the payor to insurance. It only authorized him to apply for 
insurance and pay the premium. In the second, the amount 
[>aid back to the insured as a dividend meant the premium 
was that much less. In both the basic theory is that the 
amount paid by the insured for the insurance is the premium. 
Here, as the bail agent is the insurer's agent, what he 
receives from the applicant for the insurance-that is, what the 
applicant pays for the bail bond is the premium. \Vhat the 
agent receives, in legal effect the insurer receives. The so-
called "fees" received by the bail agent do not result in a 
r·eduction of the cost to the insured. 
[9] In varions aspects the contention is made that ad-
ministrative construction requires the conclusion that the 9 
per cent retained by the agent is not premium. It is pointed 
orrt that the state has collected a tax on only the 1 per cent 
received by National. That is all its books would show, and a 
ll eglect to coilect the tax because of failure to look beyond 
those books is hardly a comrwlling construction that the 1 per 
cent was the only premium. [10] Moreover, it must be re-
membered, concerning this question of administrative con-
stnwtion, that where it is erroneous it is not binding on the 
(~on rt. ( Californirr Drive-In Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 
Ca1.2d 287 [140 P.2cl 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028] ; Bodinson Mfg. 
Go. v. Cali.foTnia Emp. Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109 P.2d 9~5] .) 
It is urged that if the bail bond is cancelled the insurer 
(National) is liable for a return of only 1 per cent stated 
as premium on the fare of the bond (citing l nsurance Code, 
§§ 480-48~1 a!H'I hPncr the 1 per cent is the only premium. 
'!'hose sections deal, howevee, with the requirement that pre-
miums be returned, whatever they be rather t1Jan what con-
stitutes preminms. and are thns of no assistance. Moreover, 
the general agent, and plaintiff testified that the whole amount 
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received from the applicant for the bond. was returned upon 
cancellation, indicating that such amount was the premium. 
Point is made of the requirement that every policy 
must set forth therein the premium (Ins. Code, § 381(f)) and 
the commissioner's rules require separation of "premium" 
and fees in the bail agent's record. This, it is claimed, shows 
the fees ( 9 per cent) were not part of the premium and the 
state so recognized it. That is not significant because there 
may be other reasons why the agent should not make a "break-
down'' of the charge to a bail bond applicant for a bond, but, 
as seen, the full amount paid is the gross premium which is 
known by the bail bond applicant. 
'rhe judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,J., Edmond:-;, ,J., and Traynor, ,l., 
eoncurred. 
SCHAUER, ,J.-I dissent. Under the majority opmwn 
herein, as under the opinion in Hughes v. Los Angeles (1914), 
168 Cal. 764, 765 [145 P. 94], there are classes of business-
those of local insurance agent and of bail bondsman-in 
which persons may engage without being subject to local 
license taxation. The express ground of decision of the 
Hughes case is that "in a direct and immediate sense a tax 
upon Rnch agents [general and local insurance agents] for the 
right to do business is a tax upon the corporation's right to do 
businPss" ( p. 765 of 168 Cal.). But the theory of the Hughes 
easE' and this case cannot be logically limited to freeing local 
agents from local license taxes. The provision of the California 
Constitution (art. XIII, § 14 4/5) which imposes the state 
"in lieu" tax upon insurance companies does so "in lieu of 
all other taxes and licenses, state, county, and municipal, upon 
such insurers and their property, except [ (1) taxes on their 
rea] estate; (2) taxes with respect to a trust department 
operated by a title immrer; (3) as to foreig·n insurers doing 
bnsines,; in this state, reciprocal taxes in accord with those im-
posed by the foreign state on California insurers doing busi-
ness there; ( 4) the tax on ocean marine insurance].'' (Italics 
added.) 
If the Hughes ease is to be given consistent application then 
a state tax upon an insurance agent's income derived from 
his insurance business is as invalid as a local license tax on 
the right to carry on such business. In Edward Brown & Sons 
v. McColgan (1942), 53 Cal.App.2d 504, 506-508 [128 P.2d 
Apr. 1953] GROVES v. CITY OF Los ANGELES 
[40 C.2d 751; 256 P.2d 3091 
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186 J, the Distric~t Court of Appeal was confronted with such 
a problem. There a corporate insurance agent contended that 
because of the Hughes decision it need not pay its franchise 
(state income) tax. This contention was rejected. The appellate 
court attempted to distinguish the Hughes case on the ground 
that the Hughes license tax was upon the privilege of trans-
acting; insurance business and impinged directly on the in-
suralll'f' eompany, whereas the franchise tax was upon the 
(•.orporate agent's privilege of being a eorporation. 
'l'he majority opinion in the present case recognizes the 
dii'ficulty of drawing snch a distinction and says (p. 756, 
supra), ''the soundness of the last cited case may be question-
able." But, the majority opinion goes on to say, "it may be 
distinguished on the ground that, although the franchise tax 
is eomputed on the net income of the corporation, it is on 
the privilege of using the corporate mechanism to do business 
and hence has no relation to the nature of the business con-
ducted. Thus the tax is not on the insurance business within 
the meaning of the Constitution.'' The purported distinction 
made by the majority would have no application to a state 
income tax on an individual insurance agent. 
I would, therefore, conclude that the Hughes decision is 
unsound and should be overruled. It is my further opinion 
that, even without overruling that case, the validity of Los 
Angeles Ordinance No. 77,000, as amended by Ordinance No. 
92,414, could be upheld. If this latter conclusion were reached 
then, as will hereinafter appear, Groves would not be subject 
to the license tax because nf the terms of the ordinance itself, 
rather than beeause of a strained application of section 14 4/5 
of article XU [ of the state Constitution. The ordinance pro-
vides that '' 1'he term 'gross receipts' as used herein shall not 
include any insurance premiums received on behalf of any in-
:mrance company qualified to do business in the State of Cali-
fornia, nor any eommissions paid out of sueh premiums." 
'rhis provision appears to be designed to avoid any litigation 
sueh as that in the Hughes (1914) and Edward Brown 
(1942) cases, supra, by expressly excluding from the "gross 
receipts" which are the measure of the tax the entire amount 
eollected by a bail bondsman as payment for a bail bond. It 
thus appears that while Los Angeles could have taxed the 
amount received b_v the bail bondsman as payment for his 
services (rather than as premium to the insurance company) 
it did not choose to do so. 
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'!'he jwlg-men1 of ll!P trial eourt does not recognize that 
it is bPeamw of Hw tPnns of tlw ordinane•~ itself that certain 
1 axes ea u tJOt. he i mposPd on Groves; rather, it perpetually en-
joills defendaJJt:-> from eolleeting any taxes from Groves under 
such ordinance. Since Groves may become liable for taxes 
other than those here discussed, I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied May 21, 
1953. Schauer, J., and Spence, .T., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22379. In Bank. Apr. 28, 1953.] 
Cl'l'Y (H' IDS A'\.NGELES, Respondent, v. RANCHO 
HOMES, INC., Appellant. 
[la, lb] Licenses-Construction of License Laws.-Although such 
terms as "trade, calling, occupation, vocation, profession or 
other means of livelihood" and "as an independent contractor," 
as used in a license tax ordinance, commonly embrace persons 
engaged in rendering personal services, they are not limited to 
that activity. 
[2] !d.-Construction of License Laws.-Activities of a corpora-
tion organized for the purpose of "acquiring, subdividing, im-
proving, selling and otherwise dealing in and disposing of real 
property," are more than simply those of a landowner who sells 
his realty, and such a course of conduct reasonably may be de-
nominated a "trade" or "occupation" within the purview of 
a license tax ordinance. 
[3] Independent Contractors-Definitions.-The term "independent 
contractor" may assume a variety of meanings according to 
the intent with which it is used in particular legislation; it is 
not necessarily restricted to one who performs personal services. 
[ 4] Licenses-Construction of License Laws.-Provision of license 
tax ordinance that every person engaged in "any trade, calling, 
occupation, vocation, profession or other means of livelihood 
. . . not specifically licensed by other provisions of this 
article . . . shall pay a license fee" on "gross receipts" may 
not be construed as intended to be a limitation on the types of 
business for which a license is required to be obtained. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Licenses, § 5; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 4. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-7, 9] Licenses, § 16; [3] Inde-
pendent Contractors, § 1; [8] Statutes, § 180(2); [10] Licenses, 
§ 12. 
